19/9 As A Mixed Number

Bangladeshi General (1918–1984)

Full general[ane] Bangabir বঙ্গবীর G. A. G. Osmani
Sculpture of M. A. K. Osmani
Native name	মুহাম্মদ আতাউল গণি ওসমানী
Nickname(s)	Bongobir (বঙ্গবীর)
Built-in	(1918-09-01)one September 1918 Sunamganj, Sylhet district, Assam Province, British Bharat
Died	16 February 1984(1984-02-sixteen) (aged 65) London, United Kingdom
Buried	Shah Jalal Dargah Cemetery Sylhet, People's republic of bangladesh
Allegiance	British India Pakistan Bangladesh
Service/co-operative	British Indian Army Islamic republic of pakistan Ground forces Bangladesh Ground forces
Years of service	British Indian Army (1939–1947) Pakistan Army (1947–1967) Bangladesh Army (1971–1972)
Rank	British Indian Army (1940–1947) Major Pakistan Army (1947–1967) Colonel Bangladesh Army (1971–1972) Full general
Commands held	1st Due east Bengal Regiment five/14th Punjab Regiment East Pakistan Rifles Military Operations Directorate of the General Headquarters (Pakistan Regular army)
Battles/wars	Globe War Ii Bangladesh War of Independence

Muhammad Ataul Goni Osmani (Bengali: মুহাম্মদ আতাউল গণি ওসমানী; 1 September 1918 – 16 February 1984), as well known every bit Bangabir (the Hero of Bengal), was a Bengali military leader. Osmani's career spanned 5 decades, beginning with service in the British Indian Ground forces in 1939. He fought in the Burma Campaign during World War 2. Subsequently the partitioning of India in 1947, he joined the Pakistan Army and served in the East Bengal Regiment, retiring equally a colonel in 1967. Osmani joined the Conditional Regime of Bangladesh in 1971 every bit the commander-in-master of the nascent Bangladesh Forces. Regarded as the founder of the Bangladesh Military machine, Osmani retired every bit a iv-star general from the Bangladesh Ground forces in 1972.^[ii]

Osmani entered politics in contained Bangladesh, serving as a Fellow member of Parliament and cabinet government minister in the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Along with Mainul Hosein, he resigned from parliament in opposition to the cosmos of the one party land of BAKSAL. He advised the government on restoring the concatenation of command in the military after the 15 August coup. He contested the 1978 Bangladeshi presidential election against Ziaur Rahman. Osmani died in London in 1984 and was cached in his hometown of Sylhet.

Early life [edit]

Osmani was built-in into a Bengali Muslim landowning family unit in Sunamganj, Assam Province, British India, on ane September 1918. He was a descendant of Shah Nizamuddin Osmani, a 14th-century associate of Shah Jalal. His ancestral village is in Dayamir Union within Osmani Nagar Upazila of Sylhet District.

Osmani attended Cotton School in Sylhet, matriculating at Sylhet Government Airplane pilot High School in 1934. He studied English and Persian.^[3] He won the Pritoria Prize for excellence in English language.^[iv] Osmani studied geography at Aligarh Muslim University, and graduated in 1938. He enrolled as a buck at the Indian Military machine University the following year.

Armed services career [edit]

When he joined the British Indian Army, Osmani was a member of the 4th Urban Infantry from 1939 to 1940.^[iv] On 5 October 1940, he received an emergency commission as a 2nd lieutenant in the Royal Indian Regular army Service Corps (RIASC).^[5] Osmani was initially fastened to the 2nd Battalion, Duke of Wellington Regiment, which was tasked with a New Delhi depot.^[6] After he completed the Brusk Mechanical Transport Course (November 1940 - Feb 1941) and Junior Tactical Course (Feb - Apr 1941), he was attached to a mechanical transport battalion of the Fifteen Corps and posted to Burma during World War Two.^[7]

British Indian Army (1941–1947) [edit]

Osmani was promoted to the ranks of state of war-substantive lieutenant and temporary captain on 17 February 1941.^[8] He received a battleground promotion to acting major on 23 Feb 1942, with farther promotions to war-substantive helm (temporary major) on 23 May.^[eight] Between 1941 and 1945, he held the posts of platoon commander, battalion adjutant, company 2IC and battalion commander. From Nov 1944 to February 1945, Osmani was a class-two full general staff officer at his formation headquarters, completing the Senior Officers Course afterward the war.^[ix]

He was attached to British Indian Army HQ Bihar and Orissa Surface area from May to July 1946. On 13 July 1946, Osmani was granted a regular commission in the British Indian Ground forces, with a promotion to noun captain on five October 1946.^[x] He subsequently completed the Senior Officers Course in February 1947, and was promoted to local lieutenant colonel.^[eleven] He was posted to British Indian Army GHQ in Simla in the Quartermaster Full general and Ordnance Branches until August 1947. From Baronial to 6 October 1947 he served as GSO-two at the HQ of Claude Auchinleck in New Delhi. Although Osmani had passed the Indian Civil Service examination, he declined a foreign-service position in 1947 to remain with the Pakistan Army.^[11] He witnessed the stop of the British Indian Army, representing Pakistan during the partitioning of army assets betwixt Republic of india and Pakistan.^[12]

Pakistan Army [edit]

After the 1947 birth of India and Pakistan in 1947, Osmani joined the Pakistan Army on 7 October 1947. He was promoted to acting lieutenant colonel on 7 January 1948. He was assigned to full general-staff headquarters as GSO-1, Coordination, Planning and Personnel.^[nine]

Osmani attended the Long Term Staff Course at the Command and Staff Higher, Quetta, Islamic republic of pakistan and served with Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan and A. A. One thousand. Niazi, all of whom led the Pakistan Army against his Bangladesh forces in 1971. Subsequently completing the grade, Osmani joined the staff of army chief of staff Reginald Hutton in January 1949 and (as chair of a committee tasked by Douglas Gracey to evaluate regular army enlistment standards) recommended the institution of cadet colleges in Eastward Pakistan.^[11] He afterwards became an assistant aide full general.

Infantry [edit]

After serving as a staff officer for 8 years, Osmani joined the Islamic republic of pakistan Army infantry. With a rank of major and after induction preparation, he joined the five/14 Punjab. He was posted as 2IC and visitor commander of the 5th Punjab Battalion of the 14th Punjab Regiment, part of a brigade allowable by Ayub Khan, in 1950. Osmani became commander of the 105th Brigade Grooming Team in January 1951 and commander of the 5/14 Punjab in May, followed by a four-calendar month tour of duty in Kashmir and Waziristan.^{[9] [13]}

Osmani disagreed with Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Regular army Gen. Ayub Khan^[xiv] over the treatment of Ishfakul Majid, the senior Bengali army officeholder in who was falsely accused in the Rawalpindi conspiracy and forced to resign.^[15] In August 1951 Osmani left five/14 Punjab and was posted as third CO of the 1st East Bengal Regiment, the first Bengali to concur the mail, in October.^[16]

East Pakistan (1950–1956) [edit]

Osmani became the CO of the 1st East Bengal Regiment, stationed in Jessore as part of the 107th Brigade, on 8 Nov 1951. He chose Bengali songs for regimental marching and its band ("Chol Chol Chol" past Kazi Nazrul Islam, "Gram Chara oi ranga matir poth" by Rabindranath Tagore and Dhono Dhanne Pushpe Bhora by D.L. Roy), and the Brotochari (introduced by Shodoy Dutt) became the regimental dance.^[17] Osmani ordered his NCOs to submit daily situation reports in Bangla.^[18] This brandish of Bengali civilisation was frowned on by his Punjabi superiors,^[19] who disliked the adoption of what they saw as Hindu culture.^[xx] Osmani was commandant of the East Bengal Regimental Center in Chittagong from February 1953 to January 1955.

He commanded the 107th Brigade in Jessore from Apr to October 1953 (when he was promoted to major), rejoining one EBR as CO until Feb 1954. Afterwards Osmani completed the GHQ law class and left the EBRC, he became an additional commandant (afterward deputy director) of the East Pakistan Rifles under the provincial government of East Bengal in March 1955.^[xviii] In the EBR, he expanded the recruitment of non-Bengali minority groups and ended recruiting from Westward Islamic republic of pakistan.^[21]

GHQ Islamic republic of pakistan [edit]

Osmani was promoted to lieutenant colonel and became a senior advisor at CENTO headquarters in Baghdad as part of the Pakistan military delegation from December 1955 to May 1956. He was promoted to acting colonel in May 1956, joining the Pakistan Army GHQ at Rawalpindi equally deputy director for military operations (DDMO).^[9] In Baronial and September 1957 he served as an acting brigadier, serving as DDMO until May 1966. Osmani received the permanent rank of colonel in 1961, and received advanced weapons preparation in the Us three years later. He served nether Gul Hassan Khan in 1964, who felt that Osmani had been passed over for promotion. Khan allowed him to focus on the Bengal regiments.^[22]

By 1958 Osmani was deputy director of the general staff and so deputy director of armed services operations under Yahya Khan, a position he held until his retirement eight years later. Although he reached the rank of colonel in the start decade of his career, during the next decade he did not receive a promotion. During Osmani's tenure equally DDMO in the General Staff Branch, he was a Islamic republic of pakistan Army counselor at CENTO, SEATO and Pakistan Air Defence Committee meetings.^[23]

Bengali recruitment clogging [edit]

Pakistan mustered vi infantry divisions and 1 armored brigade after the division of the British Indian army in 1947. These formations were neither fully equipped nor staffed. The number of Bengali officers and soldiers in the Islamic republic of pakistan armed forces was minor, due to the British preference for recruiting from the martial races and the difference of many not-Muslim Bengali personnel for the Indian Army. The Pakistan Army raised two battalions of the East Bengal Regiment from 1947 to 1950, and Punjab regiments were inherited from the British Indian Army. The Azad Kashmir Regiment was created soon after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947.

When Osmani joined GHQ in 1956, three Due east Bengal regiments and the East Bengal Regimental Centre (EBRC) were function of the Pakistan Army. Over the next nine years the number of Punjab regiments grew (reorganized in 1956) reached almost 50, the Borderland Force and Baluch Regiments grew. Many senior army officers believed in the martial-race theory, and considered Bengalis poor military material.^{[24] [25]} Bengali recruits, generally smaller in stature than West Pakistanis, ofttimes failed to meet minimum concrete requirements (which were based on average Due west Pakistani concrete characteristics).^[24] Many Pakistani officers favored mixed regiments over Bengali ones and some officers felt that increasing the number of Bengali formations threatened Regular army unity.^[26]

Role in 1965 war [edit]

Osmani was sidelined by the Pakistani generals, despite his service as DDMO during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Instead he devoted himself to the East Bengal regiments. He complained that the Pakistani press suppressed the contributions of his 1st Bengal unit, which was posted in Kasur during the war.^[27] Successive Bengali and non-Bengali COs of the one EBR built on Osmani's foundation, and under the control of A. T. Chiliad. Haque its battalion received 17 awards for gallantry (including two Sitara-e-Jurats and ix Tamgha-i-Jurats)—the largest number of awards of any Pakistan unit in the war. When Osmani visited the unit and recommended a Nishan-e-Haider for a member, he was reportedly furious when the battalion CO overlooked his recommendation.^[28] He organized Bengal regimental reunions, seizing every opportunity to enhance the reputation of Bengali units.

Afterwards the war, Osmani chaired the committee tasked with determining future army-reserve and logistical requirements and was president of the Army Sports Control Lath from July 1965 to April 1966. On 16 May 1966, he went on leave prior to retirement (LPR). Osmani'southward successor every bit DDMO was Rao Farman Ali, who played a controversial office in the 1971 People's republic of bangladesh War. Ali was reportedly horrified at Osmani's handling past the army; his office was run-down, Osmani was kept out of the loop and office employees treated him with disdain. According to Ali, Osmani was not promoted because he was Bengali and accounted untrustworthy by the high control.^[29]

Retirement and continued influence [edit]

Osmani retired from the Pakistan Armed Forces on 16 Feb 1967. Although he had failed to increase the number of Bengal regiments, the Pakistani high command (at the recommendation of Maj. Gen. Khwaja Wasiuddin) put the existing regiments through a battery of exercises in West Pakistan to test their adaptability and gainsay readiness. The evaluator of the exercises said the Bengali units performed well, their pride in representing East Pakistan a component of their success, and opposed their replacement with mixed regiments.

The Pakistani loftier command did not increase the number of Bengali units until 1969, when (afterward a pledge by Yahya Khan) the number of Bengal regiments were increased to x and all new units were ordered to ensure a minimum 25-percent annual Bengali representation among their recruits.^[thirty] Osmani, known as "Papa Tiger", was revered by the Bengali troops because of his efforts on their behalf. Although he was not the senior Bengali officer (Ishfakul Majid, commissioned out of Sandhurst in 1924, was older) and did not accomplish the highest Bengali rank in the Pakistani army (equally did Lt. General Khwaja Wasiuddin), Osmani, Wasiuddin and Thou. H. Mozumdar were patrons of the Bengali troops.^[31]

Political activity [edit]

Osmani was not directly involved in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Those involved sought his opinion through Khandker Nazmul Huda (Defendant No. 27, sub-sector commander of the BDF in 1971 and a Bangladesh Army colonel in 1975), and Osmani recommended a political solution for the bigotry faced by Bengalis in Pakistan.^[32] He had been questioned in 1958, before the trials began, on problems related to the case.^[33]

Awami League candidate [edit]

Later on his retirement Osmani entered East Pakistani politics, joining Sheikh Mujibur Rahman'due south All Pakistan Awami Muslim League in 1970. As an Awami League candidate, he was elected to the national assembly from the Balaganj-Fenchuganj Upazila area of Sylhet. Osmani did not serve as a Pakistani MNA, because later the outset of the Bangladesh War of Independence he joined its provisional government.

Bangladesh War of Independence [edit]

Pakistani and Bengali units on 25 March 1971, during Operation Searchlight; some unit locations are non shown.

Osmani and Ishfakul Majid formed part of the armed services informational team for the Awami League leadership in 1971. As the political crunch deepened in March, many Bengali officers of the Islamic republic of pakistan Armed Forces looked to Bengali politicians for guidance and Osmani coordinated the cloak-and-dagger meetings. Bengali military machine officers, alarmed past the buildup of Pakistani forces and concerned about their own safety,^{[34] [35] [36]} maintained contact with Rahman;^[37] some maintained contact with Awami League leaders through Osmani, who reportedly agreed to coordinate the activities of Bengali units.^[38] Toeing the party line, he advised the officers (including M. R. Mazunder, Chittagong martial-law administrator and Rezaul Jalil, CO of the 1st EBR) against "rash" actions.^[36]

Operation Searchlight [edit]

Before the crackdown the student and youth wings of the Awami League prepare training camps and trained volunteers with Bengali helpers and student cadets. The league leadership declared independence on 7 March 1971. Bengali ex-servicemen held rallies supporting independence; officers and troops kept abreast of the political situation in East Pakistan, which was becoming uncertain and confrontational. Majid and Osmani reportedly designed a military plan of activeness:^[39] capture the Dhaka airport and Chittagong seaport, sealing off the province. The EPR and police force would capture Dhaka, aided by Awami League volunteers, and cantonments would be neutralized past Bengali soldiers. Bengali officers advised sabotaging the fuel dumps at Narayanganj and Chittagong to basis Pakistani air ability and cripple armed-force mobility.

The Awami League leadership, attempting a political solution,^[39] did non endorse activity or grooming for conflict by Bengali soldiers earlier the crackdown. Warnings by Bengali officers that the Islamic republic of pakistan Regular army was preparing to strike were ignored, and junior Bengali officers were told past their superiors to be prudent and avoid political issues.

The Islamic republic of pakistan Army caught the Bengali political leadership and soldiers by surprise. Resistance to Operation Searchlight was spontaneous and disorganized, and nearly all the Awami League leadership fled to Calcutta. Bengali soldiers were largely unaware of the larger situation; many units performed routine duties as late equally 31 March, rebelling simply under Pakistani attack. A general amnesty for Bengali troops suggested past Pakistani generals on 31 March was ignored.^[40] Group Helm A.Chiliad. Khandkar witnessed the departure of Yahia and warned Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Pakistani troop movements.^{[41] [42] [43]} His 26 March declaration of independence was largely unnoticed.^[44] No countrywide communication reached Bengali soldiers to brainstorm the uprising; they rebelled when they were attacked or heard news of the Pakistani assail.

Osmani was at the home of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman when Bengali officers informed Awami League leaders of Yahia Khan's departure and the ground forces movements.^[41] After Rahman refused to become into hiding, Osmani hid in Dhaka until 29 March, shaved off his mustache (he was known as "the man fastened to a mustache")^[45] and left for the Indian border. He went to Jingira, then by gunkhole to Daudkandi (where suspicious residents detained him before the blood brother of the local member of parliament helped free him).^[46] Osmani walked and crossed the Gomoti by boat (with the help of a Bengali army signal corps officer),^[47] reaching Bharat past ii April 1971.

Meetings at Teliapara [edit]

Osmani arrived at Teliapara, where the second and 4th East Bengal Regiments (EBR) established a temporary base with a fellow member of the BSF on 2 April 1971. He held a meeting of Bengali officers on 4 Apr, attended by Thou. A. Rab, 2 EBR CO Thou. K. Shafiullah, 4 EBR CO Khaled Musharraf, viii EBR CO Ziaur Rahman, Salahuddin Reza, Qazi Nurujjaman and Shafat Jamil. Osmani proposed that the 2nd and 4th EBR occupy Comilla, and asked Jaman to formulate a fireplan. After objections by other officers that the battalions would incur crippling losses, the proposal was dropped.^[48] Zia proposed that all available forces surround Chittagong, to concur the expanse as long as possible; this thought was besides dropped as impractical.^[49] The commanders agreed to transport ii companies (one each from two and 4 EBR) to aid the 8th EBR under Ziaur Rahman.

Five sector commanders were appointed by Osmani: Ziaur Rahman (Chittagong area), Khaled Musharraf (Comilla), Grand M Shafiullah (Sylhet), Abu Osman Chowdhury (Kushtia-Jessore) and Salahuddin Reza (Mymensingh surface area).^[50] On 7 April, he instructed Q. N. Jaman to oversee operations in Sylhet.^[51] The officers agreed that a government in exile should exist formed, with the Bengali forces under its authorisation.

Osmani toured Mukti Bahini positions in Sylhet, and on 9 April he visited Aziz with two EBR Charlie Company near Sylhet.^[52] That day some other conference took place, attended by Director General Rustomji of the BSF and Bengali officers. At the meeting Osmani was elected commander of Bengali forces,^[53] and an agreement was reached with Indian officers on logistical assistance. The need to form a Authorities in exile was agreed, to distinguish the struggle from a mere military revolt.^[49] The conference abruptly adjourned when Osmani left after he heard that five PAF jets were inbound.^{[54] [55]} The following mean solar day, three more sector commanders were appointed: Nazmul Huq (Rajshahi-Pabna) and captains for Rangpur-Dinajpur and Barisal.^[56] The Islamic republic of pakistan Army appointed A. A. Chiliad. Niazi GOC for Eastward Islamic republic of pakistan the same mean solar day. On 12 April, the Bengali authorities in exile at Agartola appointed Osmani commander of the Mukti Bahini. With the germination of the People's republic of bangladesh government on 17 Apr 1971, he was reinstated to active duty and appointed commander-in-main.

Early activities as commander-in-chief [edit]

Operation Searchlight: Pakistan ground forces performance 10 April  - 19 June. Not to scale; some troop movements and locations are indicative only.

Osmani took control of the Mukhti Bahini after 17 April 1971. Since the Bengali forces were geographically isolated and lacked command staffs and a communications network, real-time command was impossible. Osmani allowed the sector commanders to fight equally they saw fit, while he toured the sectors and met with Indian officials in New Delhi and Kolkata concerning weapons and communications. Although India did not offer cloth assistance, information technology helped design Mukhti Bahini structure and expressed the possibility of future Indian intervention.

The Bengalis put up an unexpectedly strong resistance, derailing the initial Pakistani gauge of pacifying Eastward Pakistan past 10 April. Their initial success was unsustainable. They began experiencing a lack of trained men, officers, coordination, a central command construction and supplies (despite some assist from the BSF) although near of the land was even so gratis of Pakistani control. The Pakistani Army airlifted its 9th and 16th Infantry Divisions to Bangladesh past 10 April, and was poised to seize the initiative. Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, after a briefing by the parting East Pakistan GOC, implemented a strategy^[57] to articulate all large cities of insurgents and secure Chittagong; to control and open up all river, road and rail networks; to drive the insurgents abroad from the country'southward interior, and to launch combing operations beyond Bangladesh to wipe out the insurgency.

Bengali field commanders adopted a strategy of "holding as much area for as long every bit possible".^[58] The Bengali political leadership hoped to go on the Pakistanis bars to the cities, while the government in exile sought diplomatic recognition and the resistance prepared for guerrilla warfare^[59] and awaited expected Indian military intervention.^[sixty]

Indian interest [edit]

After the crackdown, Tajuddin Ahmed met with Indian Prime number Minister Indira Gandhi on 3 April and requested additional assist.^[61] BSF was offering express aid to the resistance.^[62]

Although some Bengali leaders and Indian officers expected prompt Indian military machine intervention,^[63] Sam Manekshaw explained to the Indian cabinet that the ground forces's Eastern Control would not be ready until 15 November at the earliest.^{[62] [64]} The Indian government chose involvement over intervention; Eastern Command took over East Pakistan operations on 29 Apr, and on 15 May it launched Operation Jackpot to arm, train, equip, supply and propose the Mukti Bahini. An Indian diplomat told Osmani that an expectation of Indian armed intervention in Apr was unrealistic.^[63]

Rebuilding the Mukti Bahini [edit]

Kaiser Jeep wagon used by Osmani to visit the forepart during the war

From April to June Osmani toured to boost morale and gather information, meeting with his Indian counterparts and setting upwards the Bangladeshi control construction. The Indian Army launched Functioning Jackpot; by mid-June Bengali soldiers were driven into India, developing the infrastructure for a sustained, coordinated guerrilla campaign. Although the Bengali high command had begun to rebuild and redeploy Mukti Bahini units in mid-May,^[65] in June and July, Mukti Bahini activity slacked off and the insurgency faltered.^[66] Running the war was difficult because of the shortage of trained officers. From 17,000 active-duty Bengali soldiers (Army and EPR) who faced Pakistan on 25 March 1971, most 4,000 were taken prisoner.^[67]

A sector coordinators' briefing, chaired by Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad, was held past the regime in exile from 10 to 15 July. Osmani was absent on the showtime day of the conference, since he had resigned as commander-in-principal the previous day.^[68] A group of Bengali officers had discussed the cosmos of a war council, headed by Ziaur Rahman with the sector commanders as members, and Osmani was expected to become defence minister. The program, presented past Q. North. Zaman^[69] and supported by Ziaur Rahman, was for a separate operational wing to run the state of war and lessen the brunt on Osmani. Osmani, possibly misinterpreting its intent, resigned,^[68] but returned to his mail service the post-obit day. The briefing defined the operational area, force, command construction and role of the Mukti Bahini. Osmani remained commander-in-chief with M. A. Rab as chief of staff and A. K. Khandker equally deputy chief of staff. People's republic of bangladesh was divided into xi gainsay sectors, with commanders selected (or reconfirmed) for each. Of the eleven proposed sectors viii were organized and agile by July, with sectors five and eleven following in August. Sector 10 (eastward of Teknaf and Khagrachari) was never activated,^[lxx] and it was incorporated into sector 1.

The Mukti Bahini was divided into regular forces and freedom fighters. The regular forces consisted of defecting Bengali soldiers and retired Pakistan Regular army and EPR personnel. They were organised into three battalions, later known as Z, K and S Strength. The shortage of trained regular troops meant that most of the forces were one-time EPR troops or new recruits. Trained regular army, EPR and police force personnel were formed into sector troops: lightly armed conventional units allowable past regular army officers.^[71] The freedom fighters were primarily deployed within Bangladesh.

Strategy [edit]

Although Osmani made strategy decisions and liaised with Indian officers from July to December 1971, he did non organize an operation like the Tet Offensive or atomic number 82 a battle similar to Dien Bien Phu equally commander-in-chief. His strategy (a product of his military career and the demands of the state of affairs on the footing) influenced his leadership way, and he relied on his background in the Southeast Asian sector during World War 2.

On 15 May the Indian Army began to help build the liberation force, and an Indian officer was appointed liaison between the Bangladesh regime in exile and the Indian Army. Khaled Musharraf and Osmani met at Teliapara in Sylhet Commune and prepared a newspaper on state of war strategy.^[72] Camps were gear up to railroad train a Bangladesh force of 30,000 regular soldiers and 70,000 guerrillas.^[73]

July–September 1971 [edit]

Osmani was a conventional soldier with orthodox views, and his initial strategy reflected his background. Doubt over the timing, scope and scale of Indian armed forces intervention was another influence. His priority was to raise a conventional force of regular battalions and use them to free an expanse around Sylhet, organizing countrywide guerrilla activity as a secondary effort.^{[74] [75]} The Bangladesh government in exile asked Osmani to apply the 1 arable resource available (manpower), and he did non object to the plan of sending thousands of guerrillas into People's republic of bangladesh with minimal preparation. It was hoped that some of the guerrillas would achieve expertise through experience.^[76]

Although Indian planners assisted in raising 3 additional battalions and three artillery batteries, they insisted that the guerrillas be given due attention and Osmani did non object. He disagreed with the Indians on the location of the costless area; they suggested Mymensingh, merely Osmani opted for Sylhet and got his fashion. While the EBR battalions prepared, in July the Mukti Bahini began deploying 2,000-5,000 guerrillas in Bangladesh each calendar month. At the sector commanders' coming together, the Mukti Bahini agreed to increment raids and ambushes and destroy power stations, railway lines, storage depots, communications systems, bridges and culverts, fuel depots, trains and watercraft to thin out Pakistani forces and increase their vulnerability.^[77]

Action and reaction (June–September) [edit]

Pakistani deployment in May 1971, after reorganization of Eastern Command forces following Operation Searchlight (some unit of measurement locations not shown)

The Pakistan regular army, after expelling the Mukti Bahini from Bangladesh by May 1971, experienced relative peace in June and July. Mukti Bahini activity had lessened during the months of preparation. The Indian army began shelling border outposts (about half of the 370 outposts were destroyed by the end of July)^[78] to facilitate infiltration into occupied territories. Bengali regular forces were not prepare for operation until mid-July. With the disharmonize largely centred effectually the India-East Islamic republic of pakistan edge region, the Pakistani Eastern Command began reorganizing their forces to consolidate control of the province.^[79] An East Pakistan Ceremonious Armed Force,^[lxxx] with 17 operational wings,^[81] was raised from West Pakistani and Bihari volunteers, Razakars (50,000), Al-Badr and Al Shams (5,000 from each unit).^[82] Five grand police were flown in from West Pakistan.^[83]

Pakistani authorities continued their campaign,^[84] rejecting calls for political compromise and a general amnesty.^[83] The army deployed in the towns, and the paramilitary units were deployed in the countryside. EPCAF took over the edge-control and internal-security duties of the defunct EPR. Pakistani forces occupied ninety crucial border outposts.^[78] Ad hoc units were often created by calculation EPCAF troops and Razakars to a skeleton army formation for deployment in forwards areas.^[85]

Monsoon Offensive [edit]

Partial representation of Pakistani and Mukti Bahini forces in November 1971; some location are approximate.

Mukti Bahini numbers and activity began increasing in June, the Pakistan Army deployed Razakars and the EPCAF. Unable to lucifer the Indians shell for trounce, they relied on barrages in selected areas and developed an intelligence network.^{[86] [87]} Denied permission to launch preemptive cross-border strikes, artillery ambushes were laid for Mukti Bahini infiltrators and demining operations conducted.^[66] Bengali regular forces attacked BOPs in Mymensingh Comilla and Sylhet with mixed results, and Pakistani authorities concluded that they had independent the Monsoon Offensive.^{[88] [89]}

The sector commanders reviewed Mukti Bahini activities from June to August, and Osmani made an overall cess in September. The findings were disappointing;^{[ citation needed ]} their network had non taken root, with many guerrillas withdrawing under Pakistani pressure level.^[xc] Among Mukti Bahini supply problems,^[91] Bangladesh was losing ground in the international loonshit.^[92] Although regular Bengali regular troops attacked the BoPs with spirit, more training, improve communication and coordination with the Indian Army were needed for a successful conventional campaign.^{[93] [94]} The attack on Kamalpur by the 1st EBR was repulsed, but the tertiary EBR attack on Bahadurabad was successful; attacks by the 2nd, 11th and 4th EBR had mixed results.^[95]

The failure of the Monsoon Offensive required the Bangladeshi high command to rethink their strategy. Osmani initially considered dismantling the Z, K and Due south Forces, sending platoons from the forces to help the Mukti Bahini. Although his associates prevailed against this, he deployed the Z Forcefulness battalions to help the Mukti Bahini effectually Sylhet.

Leadership style [edit]

Osmani did not micro-manage, delegating responsibility to the shorthanded sector commanders;^{[68] [71]} the altitude between Kolkata and the sector HQs and the absenteeism of direct links (communications were channeled through the Indian Regular army) gave him niggling choice. The absenteeism of an integrated command structure fabricated information technology impossible to quickly implement strategy.^[96] Osmani lived a Spartan life, wore elementary dress, ate soldiers' nutrient and used camp furniture in Kolkata during the state of war, acting as an example for his men.^{[97] [98]}

He insisted on protocol when dealing with his Indian counterparts. Every bit commander-in-chief, Osmani'due south position equaled that of Sam Manekshaw; to the Indians, his stubbornness in dealing with the lieutenant generals fabricated him hard to work with.^[99] He was businesslike enough not to allow protocol to impede the war effort, and did non see Indians working through Khandker^[100] as circumventing his authorisation.

With a curt way and volatile temper, Osmani sometimes criticised subordinates in public. He discussed the framework of the future Bangladesh army and other bug unrelated to the war while touring the front, to the bemusement and irritation of fellow officers. Osmani opposed politicising the People's republic of bangladesh forces (supported by Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed),^[101] appointing officers on merit. Although only Awami League members were initially recruited for the Mukti Bahini for security reasons, in September Osmani opened recruitment to all willing to fight for Bangladesh (again with the prime minister'due south support). Although sector commanders had previously recruited Awami League nonmembers, Osmani turned a blind eye.^[102]

He used his prototype and place in the Bangladesh forces to his reward. Osmani'due south trouble-solving ability was limited to the agenda of Republic of india and the Bangladesh regime in exile. He would often interruption a deadlock by threatening to resign. Osmani'south barefaced was chosen simply in one case; when Bangladesh forces were placed under the articulation control headed past J. S. Aurora, Ahmed agreed to accept a written resignation and Osmani dropped the issue.^[103]

Controversies [edit]

Mujib Bahini [edit]

Although Osmani was commander-in-chief of all Bangladesh forces, a number of units were beyond his control. Bengali fighters raised bands to fight the Pakistanis in several areas of Bangladesh (e.chiliad.the Kaderia Bahini, led past Tiger Siddiqi of Tangail is the best-known),^{[ commendation needed ]} and they operated independently. Although Osmani was unconcerned, the Mujib Bahini worried the Bangladesh government in exile. The Mujib Bahini leadership, initially allowed by Osmani to recruit students and other youths, had an organized, well-armed, trained strength with a principal fidelity to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and their commanders rather than the Bangladesh government.

No ane doubted the skill of the Mujib Bahini or their commitment to Bangladesh. Trained by Sujan Singh Uban, an Indian Army insurgency skilful, they operated nether the direction of the R&AW and outside the People's republic of bangladesh chain of command. Mujib Bahini members were better trained^[69] and armed than their Mukti Bahini counterparts.^[104] The Bangladeshi government and military leadership were concerned considering most Mujib Bahini recruits were former Mukti Bahini members.^{[105] [106]} Mujib Bahini activities frequently hindered Mukti Bahini operations, creating misunderstanding and distrust. Clashes occurred between the groups, and the Indian Regular army and other organizations supporting the Bengali resistance were dissatisfied with Mujib Bahini activity.^[107]

The government in exile unsuccessfully attempted to bring the Mujib Bahini under Osmani by diplomatic means, approaching R&AW managing director Ramnath Kao.^[108] By August it was clear that their independence was detrimental to the war effort. Osmani threatened to resign unless they were brought within the concatenation of command.^[109] A coming together with Durga Prasad Dhar on 29 August produced an agreement that Mujib Bahini would inform sector commanders before start operations. Afterwards another coming together with Ramnath Kao on 18 September, R&AW did not relinquish their control of the Mujib Bahini.

On 21 October Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed met with Indira Gandhi, who ordered Dhar to resolve the outcome. He told B. N. Sarkar to meet with Mujib Bahini leaders and take the necessary steps. Although the leaders did not attend the coming together, the Mujib Bahini halted their disruptive activities. They and the Special Frontier Force under Uban liberated Rangamati in December and helped the Indians dismantle the insurgent Mizo network.

Absence from surrender ceremony [edit]

Osmani was not in Dhaka for the surrender ceremony on xvi December 1971. His helicopter, flying from Sylhet, was hit in midair past gunfire and crash-landed in a field.^[110] After the crash, the injured Osmani and his crew were rescued by an Indian surveillance jeep. Out of touch with Indian and Bangladeshi HQ, he could not achieve Dhaka in time for the anniversary.^[111]

Medals [edit]

The Bangladeshi government issued iv medals of valor to the freedom fighters: the Bir Sreshtho, Bir Uttom, Bir Bikrom and Bir Protik. The list of recipients was made by Osmani and several sector commanders at the beginning of 1972.^[112] When it was published, it was criticised and initially cancelled; Osmani was accused of bias for supporting the listing.^{[112] [113] [114]}

Bangladesh Ground forces general [edit]

After the war concluded with the surrender of the Islamic republic of pakistan armed forces to the joint command of Bharat and People's republic of bangladesh on 16 December 1971, Osmani arrived in Dhaka on 22 December and set up his HQ (probably in the Log Surface area HQ Edifice in the Dhaka cantonment).^[115] On 9 Jan 1972, he arranged an accolade guard to greet Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on his render to Tezgaon Airport.^[116] The Bangladeshi government decided to promote him to a two-star ranked officer (the outset in Bangladeshi history) through a battlefield promotion to maintain the concatenation of command in the regular army. He was promoted on 7 Apr 1972, effective retroactively on sixteen December 1971.^[7]

Sector commander conference (2–11 Jan 1972) [edit]

Osmani and the Mukti Bahini senior sector commanders met in Dhaka from two to 11 Jan 1972 to talk over the future of the Bangladesh military machine and other bug. Wounded sector-eleven commander Abu Taher and the commander of the closed sector nine were not present. A commission was set upward to form a national militia from the Mukti Bahini and members of the old East Pakistan Rifles. Sector-three commander A. N. M. Nuruzzaman was chosen to control the militia.

The armed forces were reorganized, with Army, Navy, Air Force and Police personnel ordered to join their respective organizations^[117] and old EPR members joining the new National Militia.^[118]

Disturbance at Pilkhana [edit]

On 16 February 1972, tension betwixt Mukti Bahini members and sometime EPR members who had non fought in the state of war erupted into a shootout in Pilkhana. Although Osmani was informed of the incident, he was unable to enter Pilkhana due to the ongoing gunfire. The firing stopped at the arrival of President Mujibur Rahman, and Osmani. Rahman defused the state of affairs. It was decided to go along the EPR intact as the People's republic of bangladesh Rifles and create some other force, Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini, from the Mukti Bahini members.^[119] In April 1972 the Bangladeshi government abolished the mail service of commander-in-primary, replacing it with a Chief of Army Staff, Primary of Air Staff and Chief of Naval Staff to carve up the services' command structures.^[120]

Chiffonier minister [edit]

Although Osmani may take hoped to become defense government minister,^[121] when the authorities abolished the post of commander-in-chief he retired from the Regular army on vii Apr and was appointed Government minister for Air and Inland H2o Ship five days afterward (armed-forces personnel may not agree political office).

Osmani resigned from the cabinet in May 1975, after the introduction of a i-party government in accordance with the 4th amendment to the constitution. He and Mainul Hosein resigned from the Awami League in protest of the abolitionism of democracy in Bangladesh past Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Osmani briefly was an advisor to the president on 29 Baronial 1975, after Rahman's bump-off.

Army principal of staff [edit]

One thousand. A. Rab, the first Principal of Staff of the People's republic of bangladesh Army (12 Apr 1971 - 7 Apr 1972), was promoted to major general and retired on seven Apr 1972. Osmani, reportedly consulted nearly his successor, recommended Thou. K. Shafiullah.^[122] The four serving senior ground forces officers who joined Mukti Bahini in March 1971 from the Pakistan Ground forces were Salahuddin Mohammad Reza, C. R. Dutta, Ziaur Rahman and Shafiullah.^[123]

Ziaur Rahman joined the war on 25 March 1971, and Shafiullah joined iii days later.^[123] Although they were commissioned in the Pakistan Army on the same twenty-four hour period (completing the 12th PMA Long Course on 18 September 1955), Rahman was above Shafiullah in the terminal rankings.^[122] Osmani disliked Rahman, and wanted to discharge him later the battle of Kamalpur. However, Osmani may non accept made a recommendation and Shafiullah's appointment may have been a political conclusion.^{[7] [124]}

Cadet college crisis [edit]

In 1972, the Bangladeshi government issued a presidential decree in 1972 irresolute the cadet colleges to government colleges. A delegation of former cadets visited Ziaur Rahman, who helped them obtain an engagement with Osmani. Osmani discussed the issue with President Mujib Rahman, and the decree was withdrawn.^[125]

Khwaja Wasiuddin [edit]

Khwaja Wasiuddin was the almost senior ranked E Pakistani officeholder in the Pakistan Army^[126] after the forced retirement of Maj. Gen. Ishfakul Majid in 1951.^[127] Wasiuddin was ranked Lieutenant Full general commanded the Islamic republic of pakistan Army's 2 Corps in 1971 (based in Multan, Punjab). He planned to defect but was unable to do so when he was posted to Rawalpindi Army HQ as the chief general of ordnance.^[128] After Pakistan'south defeat, he opted for People's republic of bangladesh and was interned in his home. Wasiuddin went to London in October 1972 before coming to People's republic of bangladesh. Osmani and Wasiuddin served together in 1959 at Rawalpindi GHQ, and they had a cordial relationship.^[129]

Osmani met Wasiuddin at the airport, and introduced him to Awami League leaders. At age 54, Wasiuddin's feel would take benefited the Bangladesh Ground forces. It was rumoured that Osmani would recommend him to the authorities every bit Army Chief of Staff, but some Mukti Bahini members of the army staff threatened to resign. Although Osmani was reportedly hurt by the turn of events,^[130] Wasiuddin received an ambassadorship. When Shafiullah (who replaced Rab as Chief of Staff in April) asked Rahman well-nigh the rumours, the president reportedly said that only a tested patriot would exist a chief of staff.^[131]

Presidential defense force advisor [edit]

Osmani did not support the xv August 1975 assassinations, and did not tolerate undue criticism of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.^{[132] [133]} He accepted a post as defense force advisor (the equivalent of a cabinet minister) to Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, who took over as president after the xv Baronial coup and may accept been involved. Osmani, who ignored advice to avert the Mushtaq government,^[134] was appointed to the mail service after Ziaur Rahman was appointed Army Chief of Staff on 24 August 1975 and Khalilur Rahman became Chief of Staff in the Defense Ministry.^{[135] [136]} Although information technology was a cabinet mail, Osmani did not describe a salary.^[137] He visited several Regular army formations, stressing the need for discipline and morale, and may have hoped to foreclose further bloodshed with his influence on the war machine.^{[138] [139]} As defense force advisor, he did not oppose the promotion of the fifteen Baronial coup leaders or the reinstatement of retired army officers^[135] involved in the coup. The coup leaders had installed themselves in Bangabhaban, disregarding the army chain of command,^[140] and Osmani accepted the situation. He tried to implement the decision to disband the Jatya Rakshi Bahini, placing its members in police and anser organizations, before Ziaur Rahman received approval to integrate Rakshi Bahini formations into the army in October 1975. The insurrection leaders maintained control of the 1st Bengal Lancer and 2nd Field Arms units^{[141] [142]} (involved in the 15 August coup) and deployed outside the army chain of command. Their actions, demonstrating the weakness of the chain of control, created a de facto parallel control structure.^{[143] [144]}

When Khaled Musharraf learned of the killing of four political leaders in Dhaka Fundamental Jail, he and some staff went to Bangabhaban to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power. Khandker Mushtaq and Osmani spent the solar day negotiating, and Shaffat Jamil came to Bangabhaban to encounter Musharraf. As he and his soldiers entered the meeting room, he heard Mushtaq browbeating Musharraf: "I have seen many brigadiers and general of [the] Pakistan Regular army! Don't endeavor to teach me." This angered the CO of the 1st Bengal Visitor, who drew his gun and said: "And now you will see majors of [the] Bangladesh Army." Mushtaq dropped to the floor, Osmani stood between him and the officeholder and asked Shaffat Jamil to restore order. After Mushtaq resigned and a new government was formed, Osmani resigned.^[145]

Death [edit]

In 1983, at age 65, Osmani was diagnosed with cancer at the Combined Military Infirmary (CMH) in Dhaka and was flown to London for treatment at St Bartholomew's Hospital at government expense. Most of his fourth dimension in the UK was spent at the habitation of his nephew and niece, Mashahid Ali and Sabequa Chowdhury.^{[ citation needed ]} He died on 16 February 1984.^[146] Osmani'southward body was flown to Bangladesh, and he was buried with total military honours adjacent to his mother's grave in Darga, Sylhet.^{[ citation needed ]}

Legacy [edit]

The aerodrome in Osmani'due south hometown, Sylhet, has been named in his honor.

Osmani, nicknamed bongobir (Hero of Bengal), had a major part in organising the Bangladesh armed forces. The international airport in his hometown, Sylhet, was named Osmani Antorjatik Biman Bondor (Osmani International Airdrome) for him. Mag Osmani Medical Higher and the city'south land-run hospital also commemorate him. Osmani Memorial Auditorium in Dhaka, Osmani Main School is in the London Borough of Belfry Hamlets.^[147] The Osmani Museum is in Sylhet.

See as well [edit]

• Timeline of the Bangladesh Liberation State of war
• Artistic depictions of the People's republic of bangladesh Liberation War
• Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
• Liberation War Museum
• Rape during the Bangladesh Liberation State of war
• Awards and decorations of the Bangladesh Liberation State of war

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External links [edit]

19/9 As A Mixed Number,

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M._A._G._Osmani

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